Abstract. Several identity based and implicitly authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed in recent years and none of them has achieved all required security properties. In this paper, we propose an efficient identity-based and authenticated key agreement protocol IDAK using Weil/Tate pairing. The security of IDAK is proved in Bellare-Rogaway model. Several required properties for key agreement protocols are not implied by the Bellare-Rogaway model. We proved these properties for IDAK separately.
Introduction
Key establishment protocols are one of the most important cryptographic primitives that have been used in our society. The first unauthenticated key agreement protocol based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques were proposed by Diffie and Hellman [15] . Since this seminal result, many authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed and the security properties of key agreement protocols have been extensively studied. In order to implement these authenticated key agreement protocols, one needs to get the corresponding party's authenticated public key. For example, in order for Alice and Bob to execute the NIST recommended MQV key agreement protocol [20, 26] , Alice needs to get an authenticated public key g b for Bob and Bob needs to get an authenticated public key g a for Alice first, where a and b are Alice and Bob's private keys respectively. One potential approach for implementing these schemes is to deploy a public key infrastructure (PKI) system, which has proven to be difficult. Thus it is preferred to design easy to deploy authenticated key agreement systems. Identity based key agreement system is such an example.
In 1984, Shamir [32] proposed identity based cryptosystems where user's identities (such as email address, phone numbers, office locations, etc.) could be used as the public keys. Several identity based key agreement protocols (see, e.g., [11, 17, 22, 27, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38] ) have been proposed since then. Most of them are not practical or do not have all required security properties. Joux [18] proposed a one-round tripartite non-identity based key agreement protocol using Weil pairing. Then feasible identity based encryption schemes based on Weil or Tate paring were introduced by Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara [30] and later by Boneh and Franklin [7] independently.
Based on Weil and Tate pairing techniques, Smart [36] , Chen-Kudla [11] , Scott [31] , Shim [33] , and McCullagh-Barreto [22] designed identity based and authenticated key agreement protocols. Chen-Kudla [11] showed that Smart's protocol is not secure in several aspects. Cheng et al. [13] pointed out that Chen-Kudla's protocol is not secure againt unknown key share attacks. Scott's protocol is not secure against man in the middle attacks. Sun and Hsieh [37] showed that Shim's protocol is insecure against key compromise impersonation attacks or man in the middle attacks. Choo [14] showed that McCullagh and Barreto's protocol is insecure against key revealing attacks. McCullagh and Barreto [23] revised their protocol. But the revised protocol does not achieve weak perfect forward secrecy property. In this paper, we propose an efficient identity based and authenticated key agreement protocol achieving all security properties that an authenticated key agreement protocol should have.
The advantage of identity based key agreement is that non-PKI system is required. The only prerequisite for executing identity based key agreement protocols is the deployment of authenticated system-wide parameters. Thus, it is easy to implement these protocols in relatively closed environments such as government organizations and commercial entities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In §2 we briefly describe bilinear maps, bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, and its variants. In §3, we describe our identity based and authenticated key agreement protocol IDAK. §4 describes a security model for identity based key agreement. In section §5, we prove the security of IDAK key agreement protocol. In sections §6 and §7, we discuss key compromise impersonation resilience and perfect forward secrecy properties of IDAK key agreement protocol.
Bilinear maps and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions
In the following, we briefly describe the bilinear maps and bilinear map groups. The details could be found in Joux [18] and Boneh and Franklin [7] .
1. G and G 1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order q. 2. g is a generator of G.
A bilinear map is a mapê : G × G → G 1 with the following properties:
1. bilinear: for all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G, and x, y ∈ Z, we haveê(g
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently and there exists a group G 1 and an efficiently computable bilinear mapê : G×G → G 1 as above. Concrete examples of bilinear groups are given in [18, 7] . For convenience, throughout the paper, we view both G and G 1 as multiplicative groups though the concrete implementation of G could be additive elliptic curve groups.
Throughout the paper efficient means probabilistic polynomial-time, negligible refers to a function ε k which is smaller than 1/k c for all c > 0 and sufficiently large k, and overwhelming refers to a function 1 − ε k for some negligible ε k . Consequently, a function δ k is non-negligible if there exists a constant c and there are infinitely many k such that δ k > 1/k c . We first formally define the notion of a bilinear group family and computational indistinguishable distributions (some of our terminologies are adapted from Boneh [6] ). * q , computeê(g, g)
xyz ∈ G 1 . A CBDH algorithm C for G is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can compute the function
xyz in G ρ with a non-negligible probability. That is, for some fixed c we have
where the probability is over the random choices of x, y, z in Z * q , the index ρ, the random choice of g ∈ G, and the random bits of A. CBDH Assumption. The bilinear group family G = {G ρ } satisfies the CBDH-Assumption if there is no CBDH algorithm for G. A perfect-CBDH algorithm C for G is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can compute the function BDH g (g x , g y , g z ) = e(g, g)
xyz in G ρ with overwhelming probability. G satisfies the perfect-CBDH-Assumption if there is no perfect-CBDH algorithm for G.
Theorem 1. A bilinear group family G satisfies the CBDH-Assumption if and only if it satisfies the perfect-CBDH-Assumption.
Proof. See Appendix. Consider Joux's tripartite key agreement protocol [18] : Alice, Bob, and Carol fix a bilinear group G, G 1 ,ê . They select x, y, z ∈ R Z * q and exchange g x , g y , and g z . Their shared secret isê(g, g)
xyz .
To totally break the protocol a passive eavesdropper, Eve, must compute the BDH function:
xyz . CBDH-Assumption by itself is not sufficient to prove that Joux's protocol is useful for practical cryptographic purposes. Even though Eve may be unable to recover the entire secret, she may still be able to predict quite a few bits (less than c log k bits for some constant c; Otherwise, CBDH assumption is violated) of information forê(g, g)
xyz with some confidence. Ifê(g, g)
xyx is to be the basis of a shared secret key, one must bound the amount of information Eve is able to deduce about it, given g x , g y , and g z . This is formally captured by the, much stronger, Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (DBDH-Assumption) 
for all sufficiently large k, where the probability is taken over all X ρ , Y ρ , and internal coin tosses of D.
In the remainder of the paper, we will say in short that the two distributions X ρ and Y ρ are computationally indistinguishable. Let G = {G ρ } be a bilinear group family. We consider the following two ensembles of distributions:
where g is a random generator of
where g is a random generator of G and x, y, z ∈ R Z q .
An algorithm that solves the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman decision problem is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm that can effectively distinguish these two distributions. That is, given a tuple coming from one of the two distributions, it should output 0 or 1, and there should be a non-negligible difference between (a) the probability that it outputs a 1 given an input from {X ρ }, and (b) the probability that it outputs a 1 given an input from {Y ρ }. The bilinear group family G satisfies the DBDH-Assumption if the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable. Remark. The DBDH-Assumption is implied by a slightly weaker assumption: perfect-DBDH-Assumption. A perfect-DBDH statistical test for G distinguishes the inputs from the above {X ρ } and {Y ρ } with overwhelming probability. The bilinear group family G satisfies the perfect-DBDH-Assumption if there is no such probabilistic polynomialtime statistical test.
The scheme IDAK
In this section, we describe our identity-based and authenticated key agreement scheme IDAK. Let k be the security parameter given to the setup algorithm and IG be a bilinear group parameter generator. We present the scheme by describing the three algorithms: Setup, Extract, and Exchange. Setup: For the input k ∈ Z + , the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Run IG on k to generate a bilinear group G ρ = {G, G 1 ,ê} and the prime order q of the two groups G and G 1 . 2. Pick a random master secret α ∈ Z * q . 3. Choose cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1} * → G and π :
The system parameter is q, g, G, G 1 ,ê, H, π and the master secret key is α.
Extract: For a given identification string ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the algorithm computes a generator g ID = H(ID) ∈ G, and sets the private key d ID = g α ID where α is the master secret key.
Exchange: For two participants Alice and Bob whose identification strings are ID A and ID B respectively, the algorithm proceeds as follows.
and sends it to Bob. 2. Bob selects y ∈ R Z * q , computes R B = g y IDB , and sends it to Alice.
Alice computes s
A = π(R A , R B ), s B = π(R B , R A ), and the shared secret sk AB asê (g ID A , g ID B ) (x+sA)(y+sB )α =ê d (x+sA) IDA , g sB IDB · R B .
Bob computes s
In the next section, we will show that IDAK protocol is secure in Bellare and Rogaway [4] model with random oracle plus DBDH-Assumption. We conclude this section with a theorem which says that the shared secret established by the IDAK key agreement protocol is computationally indistinguishable from a random value.
are computationally indistinguishable, where α, x, y, z are selected from Z * q uniformly.
Before we give a proof for Theorem 2, we first prove two lemmas that will be used in the proof of the Theorem. [24] 
Lemma 1. (Naor and Reingold
Proof. Using a random reduction, Naor and Reingold [24, Lemma 4.4] (see also Shoup [35, §5.3.2] showed that the two distributions R, (g xiyj : i, j ≤ m) and R, (g uij : i, j ≤ m) are computationally indistinguishable. The proof can be directly modified to obtain a proof for this Lemma. The details are omitted. Lemma 2. Let G = {G ρ } be a bilinear group family, G ρ = G, G 1 ,ê , g be a random generator of G,ĝ =ê(g, g), and f 1 and f 2 be two polynomial-time computable functions. If the two distributions
Proof. See Appendix. =ê(g, g) .By Lemma 1, the two distributions
Proof of Theorem 2 Letĝ
are computationally indistinguishable assuming that DBDH-Assumption holds for G, where g is a random generator of G ρ and α, x, y, z
Since π is a fixed function from G to Z * q and q is a prime, it is straightforward to verify that for any α, x, y ∈ Z q ,ĝ
x ) are uniformly (and independently of each other) distributed over G 1 . It follows that the distribution
is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution Y, where z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ∈ R Z q . Thus X and Z are computationally indistinguishable. The Theorem now follows from Lemma 2.
The security model
Our security model is based on Bellare and Rogaway [4] security models for key agreement protocols with several modifications. In our model, we assume that we have at most m ≤ poly(k) protocol participants (principals): ID 1 , . . . , ID m , where k is the security parameter. The protocol determines how principals behave in response to input signals from their environment. Each principal may execute the protocol multiple times with the same or different partners. This is modelled by allowing each principal to have different instances that execute the protocol. An oracle Π s i,j models the behavior of the principal ID i carrying out a protocol session in the belief that it is communicating with the principal ID j for the sth time. One given instance is used only for one time. Each Π s i,j maintains a variable view (or transcript) consisting of the protocol run transcripts so far.
The adversary is modelled by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine that is assumed to have complete control over all communication links in the network and to interact with the principals via oracle accesses to Π The difference between the queries Extract and Corrupt is that the adversary can use Extract to get the private key for an identity string of her choice while Corrupt can only be used to get the private key of existing principals.
Let Π s ij be an initiator oracle (that is, it has received a λ message at the beginning) and Π [3] .
For the definition of matching oracles, the reader should be aware the following scenarios: Even though the oracle Π In order to define the notion of a secure session key exchange, the adversary is given an additional experiment. That is, in addition to the above regular queries, the adversary can choose, at any time during its run, a Test(Π -The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Extract(ID i )
or Extract(ID j ). -The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Corrupt(i) or Corrupt(j). -The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Reveal(Π s i,j ).
-The adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Reveal(Π i,j . Otherwise, the adversary is given a value r randomly chosen from the probability distribution of keys generated by the protocol. In the end, the attacker outputs a bit b ′ . The advantage that the adversary has for the above guess is defined as
Now we are ready to give the exact definition for a secure key agreement protocol. However, the following important security properties that a secure key agreement scheme should have are not implied from the original BR-security model.
Definition 2. A key agreement protocol
-Perfect forward secrecy. This property requires that previously agreed session keys should remain secret, even if both parties' long-term private key materials are compromised. Bellare-Rogaway model does not capture this property. Canetti and Krawczyk's model [9] use the session-key expiration primitive to capture this property. Similar modification to Bellare-Rogaway model are required to capture this property also. We will give a separate proof that the IDAK key agreement protocol achieves weak perfect forward secrecy. Note that as pointed out in [19] , no two-message key-exchange protocol authenticated with public keys and with no secure shared state can achieve perfect forward secrecy. -Key compromise impersonation resilience. If the entity A's long term private key is compromised, then the adversary could impersonate A to others, but it should not be able to impersonate others to A. Similar to wPFS property, Bellare-Rogaway model does not capture this property. We will give a separate proof that the IDAK key agreement protocol has this property.
Before we present the security proof for the IDAK key agreement protocol, we first prove some preliminary results that will be used in the security proof.
Lemma 3. Let G = {G ρ } be a bilinear group family, G ρ = G, G 1 ,ê , g be a random generator of G, and π : G × G → Z q be a random oracle. Assume DBDH-Assumption holds for G and let X and Y be two distributions defined as
Then we have
The two distributions X and Y are computationally indistinguishable if R is defined as
, α, β, γ, x, t, x 0 are chosen from Z * q uniformly, g r = g γ or r is either chosen from Z * q uniformly, g A and g γy0 are chosen from G within polynomial time according
For any constant m ≤ poly(k), the two distributions X and Y are computationally indistinguishable if R is defined as:
where α, β, γ, x i are uniformly chosen from Z * q , r j are either chosen from Z * q uniformly or g rj = g γ , and g A,l is chosen within polynomial time according to a fixed distribution given the view (g xi , g rj , g α , g β , g γ , g βx0 : i, j, l ≤ m) without violating DBDH-Assumption. 3 . For any constant m ≤ poly(k), the two distributions X and Y are computationally indistinguishable if R = (R 1 , R 2 ), where R 1 is defined as the R in the item 2, and R 2 is defined as:
where r j are either chosen from Z * q uniformly or g rj = g γ , g A,i and g A,l are chosen within polynomial time according to a fixed distribution given the view
) without violating DBDH-Assumption and with the condition that "g
Proof. See Appendix. 
Weak Perfect forward secrecy
In this section, we show that the protocol IDAK achieves weak perfect forward secrecy property. Perfect forward secrecy property requires that even if Alice and Bob lose their private keys d IDA = g α IDA and d IDB = g α IDB , the session keys established by Alice and Bob in the previous sessions are still secure. Krawczyk [19] pointed out that no two-message key-exchange protocol authenticated with public keys and with no secure shared state can achieve perfect forward secrecy. Weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS) property for key agreement protocols sates as follows [19] : any session key established by uncorrupted parties without active intervention by the adversary is guaranteed to remain secure even if the parties to the exchange are corrupted after the session key was erased from the parties memory (for a formal definition, the reader is referred to [19] ).
In the following, we show the IDAK achieves wPFS property. Using the similar primitive of "session-key expiration" as in Canetti and Krawczyk's model [9] , we can revise Bellare-Rogaway model so that wPFS property is provable also. In BellareRogaway model, the Test(Π s i,j ) query is allowed only if the four properties in Section 4 are satisfied. We can replace the property "the adversary has never issued, at any time during its run, the query Corrupt(i) or Corrupt(j)" with the property "the adversary has never issued, before the session Π s i,j is complete, the query Corrupt(i) or Corrupt(j)". We call this model the wpfsBR model. In the final version of this paper, we will show that the protocol IDAK is secure in the wpfsBR model. Thus IDAK achieves wPFS property. In the following, we present the essential technique used in the proof. It is essentially sufficient to show that the two distributions (R,ê(g ID A , g ID B )
z )
and R,ê(g ID A , g ID B )
(x+π(g
,g
))α are computationally indis-
and uniform at random chosen g ID A , g ID B , x, y, z, α. Consequently, it is sufficient to prove the following theorem. 
are computationally indistinguishable for random chosen g 1 , g 2 , x, y, z, α.
Proof. We use a random reduction. For a contradiction, assume that there is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm D that distinguishes X and Y with a non-negligible probability δ k . We construct a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm A that distinguishes (R,ê(g, g) t ) and (R,ê(g, g) uvw ) with δ k , where R = (g, g u , g v , g w ) and u, v, w, t are uniformly at random in Z q . Let the input of A be (R,ê(g, g)t), wherẽ t is either uvw or uniformly at random in Z q . We construct A as follows. A chooses random c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ∈ Z q and sets g 2 )z . Note that ift = uvw, then c 1 , c 2 , α, x, y are uniform in Z q (and independent of each other and of u, v, w) and xyα =z. Otherwise, c 1 , c 2 , α, x, y are uniform in Z q and independent of each other and of u, v, w. Therefore, by the definitions,
uvw with δ k . This is a contradiction.
Though Theorem 4 shows that the protocol IDAK achieves weak perfect forward secrecy even if both participating parties' long term private keys were corrupted, IDAK does not have perfect forward secrecy when the master secret α were leaked. The perfect forward secrecy against the corruption of α could be achieved by requiring Bob (the responder in the IDAK protocol) to send g y IDA in addition to the value R B = g y IDB and by requiring both parties to compute the shared secret as H(g xy IDA ||sk AB ) where sk AB is the shared secret established by the IDAK protocol.
Key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience
In this section, we informally show that the protocol IDAK has the key compromise impersonation resilience property. That is, if Alice loses her private key d A = g α IDA , then the adversary still could not impersonate Bob to Alice. For a formaly proof of KCI, we still need to consider the information obtained by the adversary by Reveal, Extract, Send, Corrupt queries in other sessions. This will be done in the final version of this paper.
In order to show KCI for IDAK, it is (informally) sufficient to show that the two dis-
are computationally indistinguishable for R = (g 
are computationally indistinguishable for random chosen g 1 , g 2 , x, z, α, where R B is chosen according to some probabilistic polynomial time distribution.
Proof. Since g x 1 is chosen uniform at random, and π is a random oracle, we may assume that R B · g π(RB ,g is uniformly distributed over G when R B is chosen according to any probabilistic polynomial time distribution. Thus the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4 and the details are omitted. The theorem could also be proved using the Splitting lemma [28] which was used to prove the fork lemma. Briefly, the Splitting lemma translates the fact that when a subset A is "large" in a product space X × Y , it has many large sections. Using the Splitting lemma, one can show that if D can distinguish X and Y, then by replaying D with different random oracle π, one can get sufficient many tuples (g 1 , g 2 , g Thus, for the above tuple, we can distinguishê (g 1 , g 2 ) xα fromê (g, g) z for random chosen z. This is a contradiction with the DBDH-Assumption.
Proof of Claim:
The responses to H-queries and π-queries are the same as in the real attack since the response is uniformly distributed. All responses to the getID queries, private key extract queries, message delivery queries, reveal queries, and corrupt queries are valid. It remains to show that the response to the test query is valid also. Whent is uniformly distributed over Z q , then Theorem 2 shows that X =ê(g, g)
(uI +π(RI ,RJ ))(uJ +π(RJ ,RI ))t is uniformly distributed over G and is computationally indistinguishable from a random value before A's view. Therefore, by definition of the algorithm A, we have
2 > δ k . Suppose A makes a total of q E H-queries. We next calculate the probability that S does not abort during the simulation. The probability that S does not abort for Extract queries is (q E − 2)/q E . The probability that S does not abort for Corrupt queries is (q E − 2)/q E . The probability that S does not abort for Test queries is 2/q 2 E . Therefore, the probability that S does not abort during the simulation is 2(q E −2)
2 /q 4 E . This shows that S's advantage in distinguishing the distributions X and Y in Lemma 3 is at least 2δ k (q E − 2) 2 /q 4 E which is non-negligible. To complete the proof of Theorem 3, it remains to show that the communications between S and the challenger are carried out according to the distributions X and Y of Lemma 3. For a Reveal(Π s I,j ) query, the challenger outputsê g π(Rj ,RI ) IDj
